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ARGUMENT
I.

YARDLEY'S ARGUMENT REGARDING THIS COURT'S
JURISDICTION BASED UPON THE FINAL JUDGMENT
UNDER UTAH R. CIV. P. 41 IS CONTRARY TO THE PARTIES'
AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY.

In addition to the binding legal authority relied upon by Phoenix Indemnity in its
opening brief (and in opposition to summary disposition) showing that the dismissal of
the underlying matter was an adjudication on the merits, this Court should examine the
public policy implications of Yardley's elevation of superficial form over reasoned
substance. Yardley and Phoenix Indemnity agreed to dismiss this case because it was in
the best interest of themselves and the judicial system. Were it not for the settlement, any
judgment would not have been final until the completion of Guaranty's declaratory
judgment action.1 The trial court refused to permit the litigation of Yardley's coverage
and her negligence in the same action. Yardley and her attorneys understood that a
judgment would adversely affect Yardley's credit. See Yardley's Addendum #5. And
both parties expressly agreed that their agreement did not affect or address Phoenix
Indemnity's appeal from the final order of dismissal. Id
In other words, the parties worked out their differences like grown-ups. A
mechanical application of the general rule that Rule 41 dismissals do not normally give

1

While the issue of a motorist being "uninsured" for the UM coverage trigger
does not depend on whether the person is, in fact, uninsured (Guaranty's mere assertions
were enough), the issue of no-fault tort immunity does require that the person be actually
uninsured — not just denied coverage.
1

rise to appellate jurisdiction (if applied indiscriminately to all cases) would encourage
litigation and "incivility"2 for no good reason.
One justification for the general rule relied upon by Yardley is to prevent parties
from conferring appellate jurisdiction on themselves through voluntary dismissals. That
justifiable fear is not present in this case. None of the other justifications underlying the
rule are present in this case either. Phoenix Indemnity should not lose its right to appeal a
decision actually rendered by the trial court and rendered final upon the dismissal of all
other claims for not being stubborn and heartless regarding the effect of a judgment
against Yardley. Moreover, Yardley should not be heard to complain that actions done
for her benefit should now undermine Phoenix Indemnity's right to appeal which right,
she agreed, was expressly reserved. More importantly, the final order of dismissal did, in
fact, terminate all issues except for the expressly reserved issue presented by this appeal.3
Yardley's arguments would be persuasive if the effect of the parties' agreement
did, in fact, render the issues presented by this appeal "moot" as Yardley conclusorily
proclaims. See Yardley's Brief at p. 6. If the effect of this appeal would be to render an
advisory opinion, or if full litigation of this appeal were simply an academic exercise with
no potential effect for either party, then this Court would not have jurisdiction. However,
2

"Civility" is the newest hollow catch-phrase into which many absurd meanings
are often poured. If it means anything, it references the laudable goal that lawyers should
at least try to conform to normal standards associated with being a grown-up. Yardley's
arguments would further the opposite of that goal.
3

See Hales v. Oldrovd, 2000 UT App. 75, n. 2, 999 P.2d 588.
2

the effect of this appeal will be Yardley's full reimbursement of the sums paid on her
behalf by Phoenix Indemnity. Yardley's harried opposition to accountability belies her
assertion that the issues presented herein are moot.

II.

INDEMNITY IS DIFFERENT FROM NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY.

Yardley repeatedly insists that the jury verdict regarding comparative fault
measured Phoenix Indemnity's sole right of reimbursement through subrogation.4
Yardley asserts that a claim for indemnity is a "sidestep" of comparative negligence
principles. See Yardley Brief at pp. 8-9. Yardley explains that "[i]f the legislature
wanted to provide some exception to the comparative fault statute for indemnity, it would
have been an easy matter to say so in the statute." Id. at n. 6. Yardley's assertions are
without merit. It was an easy matter for the legislature, and the legislature did so provide:
78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity,
contribution.
. . . Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or
impairs any right to indemnity or contribution arising from statute,
contract, or agreement.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-27-43.

4

Yardley asserts that "subrogation" is a statutory right. See Yardley's Brief at
pp. 10-11, 19. Subrogation is an equitable remedy. While Section 31A-21-108 gives an
insurance company the right to bring a cause of action in the name of its insured, that
statute does not confer any substantive rights. The purpose is to clarify the effect of Utah
R. Civ. P. 17. Under the common law, by contrast, the derivative rights pursued in a
subrogation action could only be brought in the name of the person(s) who originally
possessed the rights.
3

In addition to failing to read the comparative negligence statute, Yardley has failed
to comprehend the fundamental distinction between her negligence liability and her
liability under the implied contract of indemnity.
A common-law indemnity action is . . . wholly distinct from the
underlying action which gave rise to the right of indemnity.
Davidson Lumber Sales. Inc. v. Bonneville Inv.. Inc.. 794 P.2d 11,14 (Utah 1990)
(explaining when a cause of action for indemnity accrues).
"[T]he rights of indemnity . . . have nothing to do with the rights of
the injured party."
Krukiewicz v. Draper. 725 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1986) (interpreting the prior Comparative
Negligence Act (the CNA), specifically section 78-27-41(2), and holding that a
vicariously liable employer would be entitled to maintain an indemnity action against the
employee who had been released from liability by the tort-victim. Id at 1351) (citation
omitted).
[T]he right to recover [attorney fees] is, like the right of the
indemnitee to be indemnified for any judgment or settlement it
pays, based upon the relationship between the [indemnitor and
indemnitee].
Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft. Co.. 758 P.2d 443, 446 (Utah App. 1988) (emphasis
added).
Yardley's repetitive assertion of comparative negligence principles (applicable to
her relationship with Mr. Merrill) while ignoring Phoenix Indemnity's entitlement to
indemnification (based on her relationship with Phoenix Indemnity) is an attempt by
4

Yardley to assert her preference for contribution (which is barred among joint tortfeasors,
plus, Phoenix Indemnity was not a joint tortfeasor5).
Implied indemnity is a branch of the doctrine of "indemnity," a
doctrine which requires "another to reimburse in full one who has
discharged a common liability." . . . A right to indemnification may
arise from a number of sources, including express contract or statute.
. . . An implied right to indemnity arises by operation of l a w . . . .
Thus, traditionally, "indemnity" involved full reimbursement
whereas "contribution" involved splitting the damages among the
joint tortfeasors.
National Serv. Indus, v. B.W. Norton, 937 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied.
945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Yardley confuses her liability with respect to the other tortfeasors involved in the
underlying accident with her obligations arising out of her failure to be insured for the
protection of the public and Phoenix Indemnity's payment of her obligations. Phoenix
Indemnity was not and is not a tortfeasor, and its right of indemnification is not a
derivative right — rather its right arises from its payment of Yardley's debt.6
The familiar doctrine of respondeat superior is instructive. Yardley was liable for
her negligence because of her negligence, and her employer (Yardley Inn) was liable for

5

It is dangerous to rely on statements taken out of context from indemnity cases
involving indemnity between joint-tortfeasors. See, e.g., Yardlev's Brief at p. 17.
6

Phoenix Indemnity's right is derived from its obligation to pay the sums owed by
Yardley. This adds nothing to the analysis, however, because it is simply a restatement of
one of the elements — to wit: that the UM carrier "stands in the shoes" of the uninsured
motorist and must pay the sums owed by the uninsured motorist to the UM carrier's own
insured.
5

her negligence because of a rule of law. Phoenix Indemnity was liable for her negligence
because of the Financial Responsibility Act and its contract with the tort-victim. The
employer has a right of indemnification against the employee for "full recovery" of
damages paid because of vicarious liability. See Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel. Inc.,
493 P.2d 625, 627 (Utah 1972). Similarly, a UM carrier has a right of indemnification for
full recovery of its payment of UM benefits.
Indemnification which is implied as a matter of law in the realm of products
liability is also instructive. See Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft. Co.. 758 P.2d 443,
445-46 (Utah App. 1988). Passive retailers are obligated to reimburse those injured by
products because the retailers place the product in the stream of commerce and they reap
profits from the sales of products. UM carriers are obligated to pay the sums owed by
uninsured tortfeasors to their insureds because of the Financial Responsibility Act and
because they have been paid a premium. Passive retailers are entitled to seek indemnity
from the manufacturer of a defective product because it is equitable that the ultimate
responsibility for the loss suffered by the retailer should be borne by the entity which
created the defect, and ultimate responsibility for damages caused by products will
encourage manufacturers to correct future defective products. UM carriers should be
entitled to indemnification from uninsured motorists because the uninsured motorist was
ultimately responsible for the damages caused by her negligence, and ultimate

6

responsibility for her7 compliance with mandatory insurance laws will be encouraged in
the future.

III.

YARDLEY' S ATTEMPT TO DRAW A DISTINCTION
BETWEEN INDEMNITY IMPLIED IN LAW AND INDEMNITY
IMPLIED IN FACT IS MEANINGLESS.

Phoenix Indemnity is entitled to indemnity because it is an innocent third-party
whose liability was coextensive with Yardley's liability and who paid the sums owed by
Yardley to the victim of her negligence.
As stated in one leading case, the right to implied indemnity is:
"predicated upon the rule of law under which a person guilty
of negligence is charged with the responsibility for his
wrongful act, not only directly to the person injured, but
indirectly to a person who is legally liable therefor. In the
latter case the wrongdoer stands in the relation of indemnitor
to the person who has been held legally liable, and the right to
indemnity rests upon the principle that every one is
responsible for the consequences of his own wrong, and if
another person has been compelled to pay damages which the
wrongdoer should have paid, the latter becomes liable to the
former."
In other instances the courts have predicated the implied right
to indemnity on the law of quasi-contracts, as where it was said in
one case:

7

The existence of the remedy proposed by Phoenix Indemnity has enormous
public policy implications. It theoretically will encourage motorists to maintain liability
insurance for the protection of the public. More importantly, it will encourage liability
carriers to defend and indemnify their insureds rather than acting under the mistaken
belief that their wrongheaded denials of coverage will shift their obligations to the
secondary carrier which, in turn, will have ineffective recourse.
7

"The liability of the third party defendants, as indemnitors, to
the third party plaintiff, as indemnitee, is said to be
quasi-contractual... Tor in so far as one tortfeasor pays
what in equity and good conscience another tortfeasor ought
to pay, the latter receives a benefit at the expense of the
former, the retention of which is unjust.'"
4c PERSONAL INJURY, ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES; Indemnity § 1.03[2] at p. 123
(footnotes and citations omitted). Phoenix Indemnity claims, alternatively and/or
cumulatively, that the underlying public policies embodied by the Financial
Responsibility Act and/or quasi-contractual principles give rise to Yardley's obligation.8
Although it has been said that a party who pays for damages caused by a wrongdoer is
entitled to indemnity "on that ground alone." Id at § 1.03[4].
The alternative and cumulative nature of Phoenix Indemnity's arguments is hardly
surprising since this case presents an issue of first impression under Utah law, there are
very few cases nationwide which have provided cogent discussions of the right of a UM
carrier to implied indemnity, and because "'it is extremely difficult to state any general

8

Yardley suggests that there was no consideration to support a contractual
obligation and that there was no meeting of the minds. See Yardley's Brief at pp. 12-14,
n. 11. Implied contracts are just as binding as express contracts, but differ in the manner
of assent. Yardley had notice of Merrill's claim against her, but refused to defend them,
adjust them or pay them. Instead, her attorney directed Phoenix Indemnity to provide
UM coverage to Merrill (and, in essence, a defense to Yardley). See Exhibit A. Phoenix
Indemnity defended, adjusted and paid the claim based upon her implicit and equitable
reciprocal promise of future performance. The mere fact that Yardley has breached the
implied contract and refused to perform does not undermine the original implied
contractual or quasi-contractual agreement. Phoenix Indemnity's payment of the sums
owed to Mr. Merrill was sufficient consideration to support the contract. See, e,g., 42
C.J.S. § 6.
8

rule or principle as to when indemnity will be allowed and when it will not." B.W.
Norton, 937 P.2d 551 at 555 (citations omitted). However, there is no question that as
between a UM carrier and uninsured motorists, the uninsured motorists9 should pay the
damages suffered by tort victims.

IV.

YARDLEY MISUNDERSTANDS UM COVERAGE.

Yardley relies on Lima v. Chambers for the proposition that Phoenix Indemnity's
settlement10 with Mr. Merrill was not a debt "clearly owed" because the amount was not
determined through full-blown litigation. See Yardlev's Brief at p. 16 (quoting Lima v.
Chambers. 657 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1982)). Payment under UM coverage is not
contingent upon a judgment, rather it is contingent upon a showing of the tortfeasor's
legal liability.
UM coverage relies on essentially the same trigger-of-coverage as liability
coverage which is usually phrased as "the 'legally entitled to recover' criterion" under
which "Utah law requires [the insured to have] a viable claim that is able to be reduced
to judgment in a court of law" against the uninsured motorist. Peterson v. Utah Farm

9

The phrase "uninsured motorists" will be used herein for actual uninsured
motorists and/or their contract-breaching liability carriers which routinely feel entitled to
shift their obligations to secondary insurers and thereafter claim immunity from lawsuits
because the victim of their self-serving and half-baked coverage decisions purportedly
has no "standing" to force them to act rationally.
10

The settlement with Mr. Merrill was an arms-length transaction. Mr. Merrill
was represented by Steve Sullivan of Robert J. DeBry & Associates. See Exhibit B.
9

Bureau Ins. Co.. 927 P.2d 192, 195 (Utah App. 1996). Contrary to Yardley's assertion,
the legal liability need not be "actually" reduced to judgment; rather it must be "able to
be" reduced to judgment.
Moreover, the "clearly owed" requirement referenced by Yardley only relates to
the obligation owed by the UM carrier — it does not relate to the amount of the
obligation as argued by Yardley. See Yardley's Brief at pp. 14-15 (citing Perry v.
Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 1984)). Yardley does not allege
the lack of UM coverage provided by Phoenix Indemnity or any other basis which might
affect the obligations owed by Phoenix Indemnity to Mr. Merrill. Instead, Yardley only
disagrees with the "amount" of that obligation.11 She provides no authority for the
proposition that one of the fundamental aspects of implied indemnity (i.e., full
reimbursement) may be attacked based upon her subsequent disagreement regarding the
amount paid.

V.

YARDLEY HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE AMOUNT
PAID WAS UNREASONABLE.

When Yardley's arguments are condensed, it is reasonably apparent that she only
argues that the amount paid by Phoenix Indemnity to Mr. Merrill was "unreasonable."
11

The jury determined that Yardley was primarily at fault for the underlying
accident and that determination would be res judicata on that issue (i.e., Phoenix
Indemnity "clearly owed" UM benefits to Mr. Merrill). However, the jury's verdict is
unimportant to this case because Yardley's obligation to indemnify Phoenix Indemnity
was not contingent upon the jury's verdict. The important issues are (1) a co-extensive
obligation; (2) notice to the indemnitor; and (3) payment by the indemnitee.
10

Her only basis for this assertion is the jury's verdict in the negligence litigation12 against
her. Yardley relies on Galbraith & Green. See Yardlev's Brief at p. 17 (citing Salt Lake
City School District v. Galbraith & Green. Inc.. 740 P.2d 284, 287 (Utah App. 1987)).
Galbraith & Green referenced a factual situation which involved the prospective
indemnitee's settlement combined with its failure to provide notice to the prospective
indemnitor (i.e., its "unilateral" settlement). Under those different circumstances, the
Court of Appeals required proof (by a preponderance of the evidence) that the
indemnitee was "actually liable" and that the settlement was "reasonable." Id The
circumstances underlying the court's decision in Galbraith & Green do not exist in this
case where Yardley had ample notice of the UM claim. See Exhibit A.
12

The fact that the jury, for whatever reason, declined to award the full amount
paid by Phoenix Indemnity is not determinative of any question of the reasonableness of
that payment. The lower amount of the jury verdict entered against Yardley could be
easily explained by any number of factors including the fact that Mr. Merrill was a
relatively disinterested witness by the time of trial, Phoenix Indemnity had already paid
Mr. Merrill what he was due, and Yardley was sympathetic because she was seemingly
abandoned by her insurance company (the jury was not informed that Guaranty was
paying her attorneys and that it would pay the verdict). Insurance companies such as
Guaranty are encouraged to play this type of behind-the-scenes game in cases where it
can calculate its risk of being held responsible. Its thinking is that it can force a
secondary carrier to fill its role and possibly avoid any obligation to (in most cases) its
soon-to-be-bankrupt insured. Yardley presented Guaranty with its worst-case scenario
because she had more resources than most uninsured motorists, but Guaranty still found it
more profitable to hide behind the scenes than to fulfill its duties. During this litigation it
sat on its reserves earning about 17% compound interest while only being subject to the
possibility of a judgment for the amount paid by Phoenix Indemnity plus 10% simple
interest (it avoided all overhead costs and claims adjustment costs which are hard to
quantify but are undoubtedly real costs). This type of profitable business practice should
be made to be unprofitable in order to promote the legislative intent underlying
mandatory automobile liability insurance.
11

After asserting that the amount of Phoenix Indemnity's payment to Merrill was
unreasonable based upon nothing but the jury verdict, Yardley makes the absurd assertion
that her obligation to Merrill was not the same as Phoenix Indemnity's because her
liability was tort liability whereas Phoenix Indemnity's obligation was based upon a
contract. See Yardley's Brief at p. 18 (stating: "Clearly, an uninsured motorist
(indemnitor) and the injured insured's insurance company (indemnitee) do not have
common liabilities."). Yardley illustrates this mere assertion (supported by nothing but
an adverb) by comparing a UM carrier's coverage limits to a hypothetical tort-based jury
verdict. Id at pp. 18-19. Yardley does not seem to comprehend the fact that a UM
carrier's obligation is based upon the tort liability (or potential tort liability) of the
uninsured motorist. See Chatterton v. Walker. 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 1997). Coverage
limits would only be relevant to a circumstance where the uninsured motorist's duty to
indemnify the UM carrier would be reduced by the limit on the UM carrier's obligation
(to the uninsured motorist's benefit), but it has no relevance to this case or Yardley's
argument.

VI.

THE AMOUNT OF PHOENIX INDEMNITY'S SETTLEMENT
WITH MR. MERRILL WAS "REASONABLE."

"Reasonableness" should not be a defense available to the uninsured motorist
under the circumstances of this case. The only defenses available to Yardley are that the
settlement resulted from fraud or collusion, neither of which has been alleged.

12

"Reasonableness" in any other sense should be a permitted defense only where, as
was the case in Galbraith & Green, the indemnitor has not been notified by the
indemnitee regarding the claim being made by the victim of the indemnitor's negligence.
As stated above, Phoenix Indemnity notified Yardley through her attorney. See Exhibit
A. Requiring "reasonableness" would have the potential of drastically changing the cause
of action by abandoning one of its fundamental elements (i.e., "full reimbursement").
Even if "reasonableness" were an element13 of a cause of action for equitable
indemnity, Yardley would have the burden to allege, argue and prove her contention that
the settlement was "unreasonable." Her only argument is that the jury's verdict should
control the issue. Yardley's reference to the jury's verdict is without merit.
The settlement with Mr. Merrill was reasonable because it was an arms-length
transaction. Mr. Merrill's attorney and Phoenix Indemnity agreed to settle the claims he
had against Yardley for the sum of $25,000.00.14 And the amount of the settlement was
deemed "reasonable and necessary" by the trial court, and evidence of the payment was
admitted. See Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc., 1999 UT App 80,ffi[30-32, 977 P.2d
508. To the extent that the settlement was required to be "reasonable," the analogous
13

Phoenix Indemnity has analogized this circumstance with the obligation of an
insurer to pay the full amount of an insured's settlement where the insurer disclaimed
liability. Under those circumstances the insurer is bound by any reasonable settlement.
14

This is the sum paid under the UM coverage. See Exhibit C for a breakdown of
the proposed judgment amount. The amount stated in Phoenix Indemnity's opening brief
inadvertently failed to take into account the excess medical expenses which were paid as
part of the UM claim. The correct amount owed by Yardley is $35,987.18.
13

foundational evidentiary requirement is the proper measure of proof rather than the four
elements of negligence underlying the jury's verdict.

CONCLUSION
This appeal concerns the enforcement of an implied contract. The terms of the
implied contract arose as a matter of law, are governed by equity, and are not disputed.
The Court may properly apply the legal precepts set forth in §§ 76 and 78 of the
Restatement of Restitution to the undisputed facts of this case. All of the elements of
equitable indemnification are satisfied by the undisputed facts.
In addition to full reimbursement, Phoenix Indemnity's attorney fees are a
recoverable measure of consequential damages in this case. Judgment should enter
against Yardley for damages owing under the implied indemnity contract in the sum of
$35,987.18.
DATED this £ 6

day of June, 2001.
CARR & WADDOUPS

TRENT J. WADDOUPS^

Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellant
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Mr. Lloyd Elstro
PHOENIX INDEMNITY COMPANY
P.O. Box 2920
Phoenix, AZ 85062
RE:

My Client:
Your Insured:
Your Claim #:
Date of Loss:

WEST VALLEY OFFICE
3 5 7 5 SOUTH MARKET ST.
SUITE 2 0 6
WEST VALLEY. UTAH 8 4 I 1 9
(801) 966-81 1 1
FAX 801-966-8092
OGDEN
(801) 479-7848
PROVO
(801) 224-9447
ST. GEORGE
(801) 628-7787

CLAUDIA
Jason Merrill
Jason Merrill
2629825
10/20/97

Dear Mr. Elstro:
Pursuant to our recent phone conversation, I have
attempted to obtain a letter regarding the uninsured status of Ms..
Yardley.
Toward that end, I have been in contact with Mike
\L^Thompson, Ms. Yardley's counsel. He tells me Guaranty National is
Is* the only available insurance policy. To date, Guaranty National
has continued to deny coverage. Apparently, Ms. Yardley did not
pay her policy premium, and her policy had lapsed prior to the
accident.
Mr. Thompson tells me he intends to fight the lack of
coverage determination made by Guaranty National.
I have also been in contact with Ms. Jill Zender, counsel
for Guaranty National Insurance.
She is with the law firm of
Kirton & McConkie, here in Salt Lake City. She indicates that Ms.
Yardley had not paid her policy premium at the time the policy
lapsed.
Therefore, at the time of the accident, there was no
insurance coverage.
With this information in mind, I believe we have now
satisfied our obligation to show that Ms. Yardley was not insured
at the time of this accident. I would ask that you therefore send
us the settlement draft of the policy limits in this case. Please
enclose a release agreement. You are certainly free to include a
trust agreement wherein Mr. Merrill will cooperate with your
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JUNE 10,1998
G. STEVEN SULLIVAN, ESQ.
ROBERT DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 SOUTH 700 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107
Re: Marlene Yardley
Dear Steve:
After meeting with Marlene Yardley, she has authorized mo to advise you that, so far as
she knows, there was no other insurance policy in effect on the Yardley Inn vehicle besides that
of Guaranty National, who is, at present time, contesting coverage. I hope this helpful to you.
Since
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Mr. Lloyd Elstro
PHOENIX INDEMNITY COMPANY
RE: Jason Merrill
Page 2

company in seeking subrogation payback from Ms. Yardley. I will
have Ms. Merrill sign the agreement and will return the same to
you.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES

(j) . S^VdZVl
GSS:le
513.gss/al
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G. Steven Sullivan

Exhibit B

REINSURANCE AND LARGE LOSS REPORT

TO:

John Phelps
Howard Purcell
Cathy McNeil

FROM:

Lloyd A. Elstro

DATE:

June 12,1998

RE:

Our Insured
Policy No.
Claim No.
Date of Loss

CLAIMANT
NUMBER
4

Merrill, Jason
SPD 0020685
2629825
10/20/97

CLAIMANT'S
NAME
Merrill, Jason

TYPE OF
LOSS
Bl

PREVIOUS
RESERVE
$12,000

RECOMMENDED
RESERVE
$25,000

INSURED:
The insured, Jason Merrill, is a 19 year old single male, residing at 44 East 200 South, Manti, Utah. The
insured was employed at the time of the captioned accident as an agricultural plant operator.
COVERAGE:
Policy No. SPD 0020685, effective September 19, 1997 to March 19, 1998, provides coverage of BI/PD
25/50/15, UM/BI 25/50, UM/PD $3500, UIM 25/50, PIP $3000, no comprehensive coverage and no collision
coverage. The driver of the insured vehicle was Jason Merrill at the time of the involved accident.
The only vehicle listed on the policy is a 1991 Toyota pickup. The VIN is 80895. It is this vehicle that was
involved in the accident.
The agent/producer for the related policy is Worthington-Leavitt, Agency No. A28204.
DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT:
This two vehicle accident occurred on October 20, 1997, at approximately 5:30 p.m. in Ephraim, Utah. The
intersection where this occurred consisted of a four way intersection. The insured, Jason Merrill, was
westbound on 200 South, in Manti, Utah. The other driver, Marlene Yardley, was on 200 East going
northbound. Ms. Yardley failed to yield at a yield sign and hit the insured. Jason Merrill's vehicle was hit in
the front left quarter, causing damage to the entire front of the insured vehicle. The vehicle had a value in the
area of $3,500 and was rendered a total loss. The intersection where the accident occurred is an uncontrolled
intersection. The insured had the right of way and the claimant was cited for failure to yield.
Investigation of this matter includes interview with the insured for his facts of the accident. However, follow up
with the adverse party was never established. Copy of the Sanpete County Sheriffs Department report was
obtained for further review.

John PHelps
Howard Pureed
Cathy McNeil
June 12,1998
Page 2

ANALYSIS OF LIABILITY
Liability appears clear on behalf of the adverse driver for failing to yield at an uncontrolled intersection. The
insured did have the right of way as the insured driver was to the adverse's right at the intersection, and the
adverse driver was cited for failure to yield.
It has been established the adverse driver did not have coverage in force at the time of the captioned accident,
rendering this a UMBI loss.
CLAIMANT #4 - JASON MERRILL:
Jason Merrill struck the dash of his vehicle with his right knee upon impact. He sustained a laceration to his
right knee at that time. Mr. Merrill got out of his vehicle and laid down on the ground next to the vehicle while
he placed a pair of sweat pants on his knee to stop the bleeding. He was subsequently transported to the
hospital by ambulance. Jason Merrill underwent surgery on November 26, 1997, as a result of a meniscus
tear and possible chondral injury to the right knee, with an obvious facial defect. The surgery included
ligament repair and bone reshaping and reflected the utella was fractured in three places. The injury resulted
in a V/A laceration on the medial upper border of the knee. Medical specials currently total $8,463.61. The
insured's attorney has alleged an anticipated $1,000 in future physician and physical therapy costs over the
next two years.
Jason Merrill sustained a wage loss from October 20, 1997 to January 2, 1998. This amounted to a loss of
$3,776.
The insured, Jason Merrill, is represented by G. Steven Sullivan with the law firm of Robert J. DeBry &
Associates, 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107. Mr. Merrill's attorney has made demand for
policy limits of $25,000 under the UM/Bl portion of the insured's policy.

INTENDED DISPOSITION:
I recommend reserve increase to $25,000 under the UM/Bl portion of the related policy.
I recommend an offer be promptly extended to the insured's attorney in the amount of $25,000 and exchanged
for a release of all claims.
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March 16, 1998

•ALSO AOHITTEO IN IDAHO

Mr. Lloyd Elstro
PHOENIX INDEMNITY COMPANY
P. O. Box 2920
Phoenix, AZ 85062
RE:

Our Client:
Your Insured:
Your Claim No.
Date of Loss:

Jason Merrill
Jason Merrill
2629825
10/20/97

Dear Mr. Elstro:
As you are aware, we represent Jason Merrill for injuries he sustained in an
automobile accident. His injuries are the result of an uninsured motorist.
We are writing this letter to present the facts of this claim on behalf of our client,
Jason Merrill, with a view toward settlement of the above claim without litigation.
This letter and the enclosed materials are, of course, submitted only for the
purpose of settlement negotiations and not by way of any admission against interest. We,
therefore submit it on the condition that it not be used in the event this matter is tried in court.

FACTS OF THE ACCIDENT AND LIABILITY
On October 20, 1997, at approximately 5:30 p.m., our client, Jason Merrill, was
westbound on 200 South, in Manti, Utah. The other driver, Marlene Yardley, was on 200 East,
going northbound. Ms. Yardley failed to yield at a yield sign, and hit our client's vehicle in the
front left quarter panel, causing more than $3,000.00 in property damage to our client's vehicle.
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Mr. Lloyd Elstro
PHOENIX INDEMNITY COMPANY
RE: Jason Merrill
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Liability in this case is clear. The other driver, Ms. Yardley, was cited for
"failure to yield the right of way, and no insurance." However, the other driver, Ms. Yardley,
and her vehicle were uninsured at the time of this accident. Therefore, we are looking to the
uninsured motorist portion of your policy for recovery.

INJURIES AND TREATMENT
The attached medical records and reports will verify that our client, Jason Merrill,
sustained the following injuries as a result of this accident:
1.

Cervical strain/sprain.
A.
Neck pain.

2.

Lumbar strain.
A.
Back pain.

3.

Fractured right knee.
A.
Meniscus tear resulting in surgery for ligament repair and bone
reshaping;
B.
Ligament and bone damage;
C.
Fractured Patella (3 places); and
D.
Knee cap is tender on the inferior border
as well as the medial upper border.

4.

Residual pain.

Upon impact, Jason immediately experienced pain in his right knee. He was
transported by Manti Ambulance to Gunnison Valley Hospital Emergency Room for evaluation.
Upon arrival, Jason was examined by Dr. Pratt, the attending physician. An X-ray of Jason's
right knee was taken, and found to have a patella fracture in three places. Dr. Pratt's
examination of the kneecap showed tenderness on the inferior border as well as the medial upper
border. Jason's kneecap has a 1 1/4-inch laceration on the medial upper border. Jason's
laceration was sutured by Dr. Pratt in the emergency room. Jason's right knee fracture
condition was discussed with Dr. Jackson, an orthopedic surgeon, for further treatment.

Mr. Lloyd Elstro
PHOENIX INDEMNITY COMPANY
RE: Jason Merrill
Page - 3 -

Jason was discharged home with the ambulance crew, and instructed to see Dr.
Jackson the next morning. Jason was also given a Rocephin shot to prevent infection.
As instructed by Dr. Pratt, Jason went to see Dr. Jackson the next morning, on
October 21, 1997. Dr. Jackson wanted Jason to follow a conservative treatment plan by placing
him on Keflex, prophylactically for a week, and encouraged him to have physical therapy to
avoid muscle atrophy and increase range of motion. Dr. Jackson also instructed Jason to follow
up with him in two weeks for further evaluation.
Jason started physical therapy at Sanpete Hospital Physical Therapy on October
23, 1997. Jason was treated with ultrasound, electrical stimulation, and therapeutic massage and
exercise.
On November 14, 1997, Jason saw Dr. Jackson for a follow-up visit. Dr.
Jackson observed that Jason's laceration was healing nicely. However, there was still some
bulging at the supramedial aspect of Jason's right knee where the laceration was. An X-ray of
his knee was taken, and revealed a bipartite patella with some regularity of the underneath
surface laterally. Dr. Jackson instructed Jason to resume his normal activities and follow up
with him in a month.
On November 25, 1997, Jason came to see Dr. Jackson for a sharp pain in his
right knee. In that visit, Dr. Jackson noticed that Jason had a meniscus tear and a possible
chondral injury on his right knee with an obvious fascial defect. Dr. Jackson advised an
immediate arthroscopy to be performed. Jason's knee surgery was performed by Dr. Jackson
on November 26, 1997, at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center. Jason tolerated the procedure
well, and was taken to the recovery room, in stable condition.
Jason continued his physical therapy until the middle of December of 1997, with
positive results. Jason was last seen by Dr. Jackson on January 2, 1998, at his clinic. At that
time, Jason still had some residual swelling and tenderness. However, his overall condition was
good. Dr. Jackson, in his report dated February 9, 1998, opinioned that "Jason's knee surgery
seemed definitely to be related to the accident of October 20, 1997."

Mr. Lloyd Elstro
PHOENIX INDEMNITY COMPANY
RE: Jason Merrill
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DAMAGES
Jason Merrill has sustained extensive physical, emotional, and financial damages
due to the negligence of an uninsured motorist. For the purpose of this brochure, we will
separate those damages into the categories of Special Damages and General Damages.
SPECIAL DAMAGES
Medical Costs:
Jason Merrill has incurred at least $8,463.61 in medical bills, which include the
following:
Manti Ambulance
Gunnison Valley Hospital
•Emergency Physicians
Dr. Jackson
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center
Mountainwest Anesthesia
*Sanpete Hospital P.T.
TOTAL

$253.00
397.50
225.00
4,504.00
2,157.61
396.00
530.50
$8.463.61

* Records and bills from Sanpete Hospital Physical Therapy and Emergency
Physicians are being obtained, and we will pass them on to you as soon as we have them in our
office.
Future Medical Costs:
Due to the nature and permanency of the injuries in this accident, it is reasonable
that Jason will require future medical care in the form of physician visits and physical therapy.
We estimate the costs of treatment over the next two years to be approximately $1,000.00.
Lost Wages/Impaired Earning Capacity:
At the time of the accident, Jason was employed by Bailey Farms, as a loader
operator. The verification form from Bailey Farms shows that Jason works 40 hours a week and
earns $8.00 per hour. As a result of the injuries sustained in this accident, Jason lost
464 hours, totaling $3,712.00 (464 x $8.00 = $3,712.00).

Mr. Lloyd Elstro
PHOENIX INDEMNITY COMPANY
RE: Jason Merrill
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GENERAL DAMAGES
Pain and Suffering:
Jason Merrill has been in continual pain since the accident. Virtually every aspect
of his life has been affected. Jason's knee was completely immobilized for two weeks after the
surgery. He had a hard time sleeping for a couple of weeks because of the pain in his neck,
back and knee.
Jason had his knee surgery the day before Thanksgiving. Therefore, he was
unable to be with his family for that holiday because of the medication he was taking.
Because of the accident, Jason has lost his job. He had to borrow money from
his family to pay his bills and put food on the table. He registered at Devry Institute, in
Phoenix, Arizona, for July of 1998. His schooling will cost approximately $18,000.00. The
accident has caused Jason to withdraw from his classes. ^ ^ ss^/^^ufrj^
Emotional Pain and Suffering:

^

v«

^

Jason has not only suffered physically, but emotionally, due to the negligence of
an uninsured motorist. He was stressed and depressed because of the sharp pain in his knee.
Jason has gained about 25 pounds since the accident because of immobilization. Emotionally,^
Jason and his wife suffer from the downfall this accident has caused them. Jason and his wife /
were best friends for four years, and dated for two years before they were married Jason i o
noticed that their relationship is growing apart since the accident.
In Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards. Inc.. 610 P.2d 1216 (Utah 1980), the
Court specifically recognized mental pain and stated:
The pain and suffering for which damages are recoverable in a
personal injury action included not only physical pain but also
mental pain or anguish, that is, the mental reaction to that pain and
to the possible consequences of the physical injury. Included in
mental pain and suffering is the diminished enjoyment of life, as
well as the humiliation and embarrassment. . . .

A
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Loss of Enjoyment of Life:
^$^% fo ^
Jason was scheduled to get married on Octooer 24, 1997 and spend one week in
Hawaii for his honeymoon. He was married as scheduled; however, he had to cancel his trip
to Hawaii with his wife due to the accident. A month went by from the time of the accident,
and Jason's knee was not getting any better. He then underwent a knee surgery and could not
go anywhere for his honeymoon.
Jason and his wife enjoyed motorcycle racing, skiing, scuba diving, basketball,
hiking and hunting. Since the accident, Jason has been unable to participate in any of these
activities. He has spent hours treating and resting instead of caring for his wife.
Jason's loss of enjoyment of life has been significant.
Future Pain and Suffering:
Jason continue to suffer from pain and ongoing limitations from his injuries. The
test generally applied as to future pain and suffering is whether future pain and suffering appears
to be reasonably probable. It is apparent that Jason's suffering is far from over.

SUMMARY OF DAMAGES
Special Damages:
Medical costs
Future Medical Costs
Lost wages

$8,463.61
1,000.00
3.712.00

TOTAL

$13.175.61

Mr. Lloyd Elstro
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RE: Jason Merrill
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General Damages:
Pain and Suffering
Emotional Pain and Suffering
Loss of Enjoyment of Life
Future Pain and Suffering
Increased Likelihood of Illness
and/or Disability

?
?
?
?
'?..

Only a jury can place a value on these losses.

EVALUATION AND OFFER OF SETTLEMENT
As to the question of damages in this case, we have taken into consideration the
nature and permanency of the injuries, the mental anguish, the loss of enjoyment of life, as well
as past, present, and future pain and suffering.
We understand your policy limits are only $25,000.00. We strongly believe that
this case has a value well in excess of those policy limits. We look to your office for policy
limits in this case as full settlement. If the policy limits available in this case are more than
$25,000.00, this offer is void.
May I ask that you review the enclosed information and call my office so that we
might discuss settlement.
Very truly yours,
ROBERTV DEBRY &y*SS0CIATES

GSS:le
Enclosures
BROCH\11672.aI

Exhibit C

AMOUNT OF YAJRDLETS INDEMNIFICATION OBLIGATION

$25,000.00

Phoenix Indemnity's UM payment

($3,278.17)

Excess (non-PIP) Medical Expenses Recovered

($960.00)

General Damages (Pain and Suffering) Recovered

$6,228.55

Prejudgment Interest (from 07 / 08 / 98 to 07 / 08 / 2001)

$8,996.80

Attorney Fees (one-third)

$35,987.18

JUDGMENT (as of July 8,2001)

With interest on this Judgment accruing at the rate of 8.052 % per annum as provided by
law from the date of this Judgment until paid.

